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Becoming generous and respecting honor: An
experiment based on donation and trust-game with
multiple trustees
Gulnaz Anjum · Werner Gueth

Abstract This research explores the reoccurring conflict of speculations and
explanations among social scientists regarding why people do charity or behave
generously. Our participants were 256 subjects, 34% males and 65.2 % females.
Based on a donation task we elicit the most honorable member in a group of
four participants. This participant receives a substantial monetary reward and
recognition as the most generous donor in the group. An unannounced subsequent phase confronts the honor participant with the task of a single contributor in a best-shot trust game. Without knowing what this honor participant has
contributed, the three other participants independently compensate the contributor. We view the contribution level as measuring honor and compensations as
measuring respect of honor. With the help of these choice data and additional
information from the initial phase as well as from post experimental questionnaires, we assess whether respect of honor reacts monotonically to contributions
and how aspects deciding who is honored influence contribution levels and respective compensations. Treatments vary in the (non) linearity of contribution
costs. In both treatments we find that honor participants contribute generously
to increase their group’s welfare, even at the cost of their own profit. Honor
participants seem to care for their role and justify their entitlement to this position. Other participants reward respect to honor participants by compensating
them.
Keywords Honor · Trust game · Multiple trustees · Donation task.
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1 Introduction
It is widely known that people drive happiness when they are involved in charity, mainly due to the feel-good factor that comes with generosity. It is also
speculated that we engage in such generous behaviors as it is beneficial for communities at small and societies at large. All social sciences have attempted to
find a plausible explanation for why people engage in generous behavior. In this
paper we are proposing a reputation and respect based explanation for doing
charity or any generous behavior for that matter. For the purpose of operationalization, we propose that this reputation, honor and respect of honor often
result from distinguished standards of virtue and courage, possibly when maintained and observed by others over decades as in the case of Nelson Mandela.
In many business and economics frameworks it is assumed that there might
be some element of selfishness that drives such generosity (Andreoni 1990). However, recent research has indicated that standard economics theories often fail
to support this homo-economicus narrative (Aknin et al 2015, 2012; Dunn et al
2008). It is interesting to note that the evidence that has been documenting
the positive associations between populace’s general interpersonal trust, also
referred to as perceived trustworthiness, reflects on other social indicators of
a country such as economic prosperity, health, wellbeing, social equality, and
happiness (Espı́n et al 2016; Kawachi et al 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Guiso
et al 2008). Despite these macro level analyses (country level), what exactly
motivates micro levels (individuals) to act in a trustworthy manner is rather
unexplored.
In most experimental and business economics research trust and generosity
have been seen as utilitarian. For instance, there is a consensus that trust is
not self-less and is a form of self-interest; there is also a sense that it is an
expression of a calculated risk based decision that includes one’s expectations
if others’ will be trustworthy or not. Similarly, generosity and trustworthiness
have been seen and explored in terms of reciprocity, in such a conception there
is an inherent motive of maintaining mutually beneficial relationships (Barkan
et al 2015; Espı́n et al 2016; Hardin 2002; Gambetta 1988).
More in line with experimental psychology are the findings of researchers
who suggest that trust and generosity are related to unconditional kindness.
They argue for the presence of such a motive that leads to trustworthiness
and hence decisions for making contributions for others’ benefit. Many studies
have confirmed traditional reciprocity as a key reason for trustworthiness (Güth
et al 2000; Schotter and Sopher 2006; Bellemare and Kröger 2007; Bornhorst
et al 2010). This is apparent in repeatedly found direct relationship between
the amount sent by the trustors and the subsequent amounts sent back by the
trustees in a given game.
Other researchers also argue that it is because of the intentionality that
trustees’ trustworthy behavior is in fact also predicted by their own behavior
in a standard Dictator Game (Forsythe et al 1994). Meaning that participants
who are kind will be trusting even in a Dictator Game, and hence they are likely
to be more trustworthy in the trust game as well (Ashraf et al 2006; Chaudhuri
and Gangadharan 2007; Kovacs and Willinger 2013). But this does not rule out
48
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the prevalence of altruistic or egalitarianism related motives in the case when
generous offers in the dictator games are triggered by these other motives (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999; Iranzo et al 2012).
Much of the literature on honor has the tendency to portray it in a negative light. However as proposed by previous research, honor can have a functional aspect to it when it comes to caring for positive reputational concerns.
For instance, in a set of studies conducted in Germany, Pakistan, South Korea
and USA, Anjum (2016) has shown that people express more respect for members who follow norms of respectability. Such increased expression of respect
was based on whether people were able to contribute socially, the more they
contributed, the more they became relevant for gaining prestige. Hence it was
concluded that social contribution and adherence to honor norms lead to honor.
Furthermore, it was shown that people did not have to be ingroup members for
monitoring adherence to honor codes. These codes are recognized and observed
if someone wants to be on the pedestal of being honorable (Anjum et al 2019).
Finally, there is a lack of research on the conscious emotions that is to say,
how these emotions effect people’s choices and decisions. This might be interesting to find out what, on a conscious level, drives these episodes of charity
and generosity. We propose that out of the two conscious emotions of shame
and guilt, shame which is mostly associated with gaining honor or losing honor
and respect. For this study we define honor as respect and distinction gained
via relatively high standards acquired in a given group. In the lab environment
we are going to study:
– selecting an honorable participant out of a small group and informing the
other group members what qualifies their “honor participant”
– providing a chance for the “honor participant” to actually prove his or her
social responsibility
– allowing the other group members to show their respect by monetarily compensating their “honor participant”
– a single contributor and the best-shot technology (all gain equally from just
one contribution, namely the contribution of the “honor participant”)
– an additional reward phase allowing the other group members to reward
their “honor participant”.
One can compare this with trust or, more generally, with reciprocity experiments. The special features of this study would be that there are more than
one, actually three, trustees and partly non-linear contribution costs. The former allows for an excuse of freeriding in compensating by arguing that others
will sufficiently respect “honor”. Due to the latter, the non-linear costs, we can
distinguish noise from trading off own and social concerns since the ’honor participant’ can contribute less than individually and more than socially desirable.
Hence, we will explore how contributing and respect of honor reacts to such
phenomena. The process of selecting the most honorable member, experimentally implemented, is line with usual practice in the field (Nobel laureates are
widely honored but also receive large prizes, the same applies to Olympic champions). Such monetary prize is an additional aspect of our honor ceremony in
the lab. Naturally, both prize money and social recognition are minor compared
to rewards in the field. But in the lab it also does not require a lifetime in the
Business Review: (2019) 14(2):47-64
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lab to become honorable and to respect honor i.e. the lab downscales both the
difficulty of proving one’s honor and what one gains from honor. The advantage
of the stylized lab structure is, of course, control of aspects which can hardly
ever be assessed in the field like: i) the cost involved when proving one’s honor;
ii) the information about the honor participant; an obvious intuition about one’s
solidarity with group.
This study proposes a unique way of role allocation, especially of selecting
the ‘honor participant’, is expected to generate higher face validity. People feel
good by acts of giving (Andreoni 1989, 1990). We allow them to display their
generosity in a donation task. To motivate donations in the lab we double the
donations and also offer them receipts of actual transactions. Previous research
also recommends that use of multiple players for trust game could be more
beneficial for eliciting social motives in the lab environment (Espı́n et al 2016).
Espı́n et al (2016), argue that having two players in the game brings variation in
their social motives. In their framework, subjects elicit trustworthiness that can
be used to infer complex motivations. Therefore, we have developed a specific
paradigm for a trust game with multiple trustees.
Herein participants, who have earned their role, surprisingly receive an additional amount of money. This would give them the sense of deservingness and
that they are entitled to own this money. There are robust findings indicating that people are less likely to share an earned income, compared to sharing
‘manna from heaven’ (Ruffle 1998; Cherry and Shogren 2008; Carlsson et al
2009). Therefore, if participants still share their fortune this supports our interpretation that “honor” participants care for their role and position.
Previous research has shown that non-monetary acknowledgement can stimulate contributions (although there is faster decline compared to monetary
sanctions; Masclet et al (2003)). Hopefully the combination of non-monetary
appreciation (social recognition and responsibility for the group) and monetary
appreciation, the additional “honor” prize, allow to experimentally assessing
what determines proving one’s honor and respecting honor.

1.1 The game model
How the most honorable participant h in a group of four participants is selected
will be described in the following section. Assume for the beginning that h is
already selected. One aspect of honoring h is that h receives a considerably
larger monetary endowment E (actually E is composed of the same positive
show up fee e for all participants whereas E − e is given to h as the “honor
prize”). After having endogenously selected h the game process continues with
two stages:
– first h chooses a voluntary contribution c satisfying 0 ≤ c ≤ E about which
all other group members i 6= h are informed before
– all three other group members i 6= h determine their monetary transfer ti to
h where t− ≤ ti ≤ e.
The monetary payoffs in case of linear contribution costs, the L treatments, are
50
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P
– E − c + αL c + ti for h and
– e + αL c − ti for all i 6= h
The parameter α is such that 0 < αL < 1 < 4αL as usual in linear public
goods games (see Ledyard, 1995, for an early sway): h suffers an own monetary
loss when increasing c but the group of all four participants collectively gains.
Actually, in the L treatments, we set αL = 0.6. Rather than a best-shot public
goods game with a preselected only contributor, one can view the interaction
as a trust game with
– the honor participant h as the trustor and
– three trustees i 6= h.
Compared to usual gift exchange games, for example, representing principalagent relationships (Fehr et al 1993) it depends on t− whether one can only
reciprocate by gifts i.e. in case of t− > 0 or, whether in case of t− < 0, also by
punishing, e.g. in case of c = 0. Actually, we assume E = 4e so that when h
chooses c = E and each i 6= h compensates h by ti = e , the resulting payoffs
are
– αE + 3e = e(2.4 + 3) = 5.4e for h and
– αE = 4αe = 2.4e for each i 6= h
Thus, h maintains his endowment advantage of E − e = 3e over the three others
and each of the four group members gain 1.4e by efficient voluntary public good
provision and compensations by i participants. The only variation of treatment
L concerns t− which is
– once t− = 0, the gift exchange treatment L0 , and
– once t− = e, the potential respect treatment allowing the three i 6= h participants to give money to h.
What differs in the N treatments are the non-linear contribution costs and the
adapted parameters eN (> 0) and αN (> 0). Contributing in treatments
P N costs
c2/2 rather than c. Thus what h earns is given by EN −c2 ÷+αN c+ ti . In case
of general monetary opportunism so that t∗i = t− for i 6= h an opportunistic
h participant, anticipating these t∗i choices, would choose c∗ = αN whereas
maximizing the total earnings of all four group members, namely 3eN + EN −
c2 ÷ 2 + 4αN c, requires c+ = 4αN .
Since we assume EN > 4αN , treatments N allow to contribute less than
optimal and more than efficient what is excluded by L treatments for which
c∗ = 0 and c+ = E. If honor inspires unreasonable contributions c[c∗ , c+ ] we
can explore how respect of honor, measured by ti choices of i 6= h, reacts to such
contributions. In our view, the N L treatment should induce interior choices in
the range c∗i < ci < c+
i whereas the L treatments trigger more “bang-bang”
behavior, c{c∗ , c+ . Via treatment-specific parameters one can guarantee the
same efficiency gains of c+ rather than c∗ for both treatments what requires
2
αN
= 2(eL − eN ). Imposing we additionally ensured equal total earnings for
both treatments, L and N , in case of s∗.
Business Review: (2019) 14(2):47-64
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2 Method
2.1 Exploratory research questions and hypotheses
Will ‘honor’ enhance efficiency and rewarding? We will try to answer this experimentally as well as the more specific research questions:
– Do honor contributors, h participants, contribute more or less than rational
or more or less than socially optimal?
We speculate that h participants contribute more to maintain and enhance
their prestige and their group’s welfare.
– Are the other group members, i participants, more opportunistic or reciprocating?
Those, who perceive the selection of h as procedurally fair, based on contributing to a charity, may make higher compensations to h participants
(indicating respect and appreciation). Those, who perceive the selection of
h as procedurally unfair, based on contributing to a charity or may not value
charity, may compensate less to h participants indicating jealousy and envy.
The benchmark solution, predicting ti∗ = t− for all i 6= h and c = c∗ in both
treatments, assumes common and, on behalf of h, also anticipated monetary
opportunism, i.e. each group member is only concerned about their own monetary gain. This is not what we expected and also not what we observed.
What we predicted and confirmed is that:
– honor participants h care for their honor and
– I participants appreciate and reward honor, i.e. respect honor by paying
dearly.
Such concerns are by their very nature idiosyncratic and private i.e. h cannot
know how much other participants respect honor, especially since we only implemented a one shot interaction, which excluded to learn what motivates i
participants. For our experimental set-up assuming common knowledge of what
motivates h and what drives respect of honor by i participants would at best
yield an ex-post rationalization and only transform the question ‘why such behavior?’ into asking ‘why such commonly known concerns?’. Only such ex-post
justification would apply to many paradigms, e.g. most social dilemma games,
this should hint upon information about the psychological mechanisms generating such behavior.
2.2 Sample
The participants were recruited using an online invitation portal, Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE by Greiner (2004)) available at Max Planck Institute of Economics, and Friedrich-Schiller University of
Jena, Germany. We ran 8 sessions with 32 participants each. Each participant
qualifies as an independent observation. Of the 256 subjects, 128 participated
in each treatment: linear and non-linear. For the choice data collected in linear
and non-linear session’s average earnings amounted to 9, 18 (SD = 1.22) and
19, 34 (SD = 1.53), including a show up fee of 2, 50 (also see figure 2, 3)
52
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what already indicates strong demonstration for benchmark behavior. Regarding gender composition there were 34% males and 65.2% females. There were
more women than men in each session.

2.3 Experimental protocol and procedure
The experiment consists of a pre-phase, followed by the main phase. In the prephase all participants are endowed with 5 (in addition to their show-up fee)
and asked how much of it they would donate to a self-selected charity. Whatever
amount out of their 5 endowment they choose to donate would be doubled1 and
transferred to their chosen charity. Based on their intended donations among 32
participants the 8 highest donors are selected as honor participants h whereas
the remaining 24 participants are identified as other participants i. Only what
the h participants donate is actually doubled and transferred to the charity of
their choice i.e. the donations by the other i participants are purely hypothetical and not payoff relevant. The donations by h participants are deducted from
their 5,00 endowments.
In each group of four participants one honor participant h and three other
participants i learn their roles, based on the donations in the pre-phase. h participants are additionally endowed with 20 ECU and asked for their contribution
c. In the next step i participants, unaware of their earnings from h’s contributions, get 5 ECU and decide how much of it they would like to transfer to their h
participant. After that the payoffs of the four participants from the trust game
and their earnings are calculated and made public.
At the end of experiment all participants answer a questionnaire about their
motivation and some demographics. Participants are paid what they kept in
the pre-phase and what they earned in the main experiment in addition to their
show-up fee. They are also asked if they like to have a debriefing on the experiment via email and whether they want to be informed about actual money
transfer to the charities (twice the donations made by h participants). The experiment was conducted with the help of Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007).

3 Results
IBM SPSS 23 was used for all screening and analyses. Initial screening of all
data points was done before conducting all analyses using various descriptive
and comparative analyses such as ANOVA and regressions. In the first task (the
donation task), which is the same for all participants, two choices were most
popular: to give nothing to any charity (47.30% of all subjects) and to give
everything to the self-selected charity (12.50%). There are no gender differences
in average donation: mean donation by males and females are 1, 36 (SD =
1.85) and 1, 35 (SD = 1.66), respectively. Figure 5 (see Appendix) summarizes
1 This avoids the possible excuse of donating afterwards, i.e. feel warm glow for themselves
by giving outside and avoiding involvement of experimenters.
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All participants do
Carity task (Computer
selects 'honor
participants)

•In each session out of 32 participants 8
are 'h' participants and 24 'i' participants
selected based on amout of their
donation
Aappreciation of 'honor
participant'Unannounced
opportunity to act / show
responsibility

Unannounced opportunity to
act / show respect to h
participants

•h gets positive feedback: pride &
appreciation treatment 1. Pool
money is linear function of h's
contribution
•or treatment 2 : Pool money is nonlinear function of h's contribution
•other three players of the group (i) are
given the opportunity to transfer some
of their endowment h to recognize and
show respect for h
•Total payoffs of
Contribution of
every one are
h , and transfer
given after they
by i is made
have filled a short
public
questionnaire

Fig. 1: Flow of experimental protocols

percentages for all choices. It is also interesting that, in spite of heightened concerns for Ebola, the NGO Doctors Without Borders was rarely chosen. Figure
4 (see Appendix) summarizes percentages of donation choices.
Regarding the main phase two important results answer our specific research questions. The first result concerns the question whether participants
in h roles contribute more (or less) to maintain and enhance their prestige and
their group’s welfare. As expected contributions in linear (M = 7.88, SD = 6.70)
and non-linear (M = 19.63, SD = 1.07) treatments are significantly different (t
= 9.79, p < 0.001): h participants in linear treatment display a wider spread
distribution (see appendix figure 6 ). Less than a quarter of all h subjects (21.88
%) contribute zero and 50% contribute between half and everything; the modal
choice is contributing 10 ECU (25% of subjects). These findings support that
h participants feel responsibility for their group’s welfare. Giving everything to
pool money, meaning to give 40 percent of what they have got, accounts for
12.5% participants.
In the non-linear treatment, except for 4 subjects, who contribute 60 or 80
percent, everyone contributed everything, which can be justified by efficiency
concerns. This rules out that after being honored, h subjects try to punish low
donors. These findings altogether suggest that honored people act responsibly
and care a lot for their group’s welfare.
Our second set of findings are based on data of the second stage where i subjects can express respect for h participants via compensating. In both conditions
a significant proportion of i subjects reward their h participants indicating respect of honor. In (non)linear treatment 32.80% (43.30%) of i subjects choose
compensations between 0.5 and 3 ECU (see figure 3)2 . On average in the linear
and non-linear treatment i participants give 0.48 ECU (SD = 0.79) and 0.86
ECU (SD = 1.27), respectively. The significant difference in mean compensations in two conditions (t = 2.88, p < 0.01) might be due to the higher payoffs in
the non-linear treatment. In both conditions participants clearly respect honor
2 Note that i participants compensate after h having contributed i.e. they do not compensate
in order to trigger a higher contribution by h
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via compensating.
To explore causal relationship between contribution by h and compensations
by i participants we ran a regression analysis to learn if compensations depend
on contributions. In both treatments compensations by i participants depend
significantly on h0 s contribution. For the non-linear treatment dependency (linear regression: standardized β = −0.39, t = 4.78, p < 0.001) is stronger than for
the linear treatment (standardized β = −0.25, t = 2.91, p < 0.01). Thus compensations by i participants react positively to how responsibly h participants
behave.
Other findings are based on the post experimental questionnaire, to assess
a participant’s personal guilt and shame evaluations and related repair or withdrawal tendencies associated with these two attributes. Donations by subjects
show a positive but a weak association with repair tendency of participants
(r = 0.12, p < 0.05): participants tend to avoid guilt feelings by donating. For
h participants of the linear treatment there are no significant relations between
any of these attributes and contributions (see the correlation matrices in table
1).
Furthermore, in the non-linear treatment there is a strong association between contributions of h participants and their perception of shame based withdrawal. This indicates that when h participants earn more as in the non-linear
treatment, they would have felt shame when not contributing: contributions
significantly depend on withdrawal tendency (linear regression: standardized
β = −0.334, t = 1.94, p = 0.06). None of the four attributes (guilt and shame
evaluations and repair or withdrawal tendencies) has any significant influence
on compensations by i participants. In our view, this may be due to the fact
that three i participants share the responsibility to respect honor that can be
expected to weaken the influence of individual guilt and shame.

4 Discussion
The experimental decision process begins by endogenously selecting the most
honorable member for each group with four participants each. This honor person receives a substantial monetary prize as well as an appraisal for being most
generous. Then each honor participant acts as the unique trustor facing multiple
(three) trustees. Each honor participant is the only contributor, is awarded the
role of being the trustee for their group and plays a trust game with multiple
dependents. The honor participant thus acts in this task as a single contributor
of the best-shot public good game and can be monetarily rewarded by the other
three group members. This set-up allows for voluntary cooperation but also free
riding in respecting honor.
Our findings suggest that honor participants care for their group’s welfare
by contributing to the public good. They like to share their honor prize and
want to maintain their reputation obtained in the initial donation task. This
clear sense of entitlement to honor and attempt to maintain this entitlement has
direct implications for group functioning and organizational leadership. When
saliently recognized and respected, people care more for their group even when
Business Review: (2019) 14(2):47-64
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this is costly for themselves. Honor apparently plays an important role in motivating individuals to do well e.g. by enhancing their group’s welfare.
Furthermore, not only the honor participants act more responsibly when
saliently recognized, but also other participants in their groups show respect by
compensating: most of the three other participants independently compensate
the contributor, even though they receive only one fourth the honor prize. We
conclude that this compensation from i participants to their honor participant
shows respect of honor. In our view, these findings have important implications
for group performance and perceived fairness in organizational settings: followers, e.g. “trustees” or “subordinates” will respect those who have legitimately
earned their position or title.
Concerning implications for fundraising it seems that, first of all it is true
that people feel better by the act of giving (Andreoni 1989, 1990). What holds
back student participants, who usually consider themselves as needy, donating
in the lab, was managed by doubling their donations for self-selected charities.
Using quite popular charities gave another motivational buzz to donate. In our
view using mentally available charity organizations and incentivizing (by doubling) will induce more donations from participants. There is evidence (Cherry
and Shogren 2008; Carlsson et al 2009) suggesting that, when participants have
earned their endowment, they are less likely to give it away. But saliently appraising, like in our study, motivates people to give.
The respect of the honorable participants for their generosity is in line with
the research that indicates that honor is a matter of social reputation (Cohen
and Nisbett 1994; Cohen et al 1996; Cohen and Nisbett 1997; Cross et al 2013).
They mainly argue that people retain honor by warding off insults and protecting their social image in front of others. Such concerns to follow honor values
are seen across cultures (Guerra et al 2013). This has important implications for
the self-esteem of the person as they want to categorize themselves as respected
members of their group (Ellemers et al 1999). This experiment has not taken
the route related to inducing insults in the lab but it has raised reputational
concerns in the group and lab setting. It can be inferred that even when people’s
identity is hidden, they still want to be honorable and be respected.
This points to a lack of research on the conscious emotions and how these
conscious emotions affect people’s choices and economic decisions. Therefore,
this study has meaningfully explored this on a conscious level drive of charity
and generosity. In this respect, the two conscious emotions of shame and guilt
were explored and it is possible to state that shame is rightly mostly associated
with gaining honor or losing respect (Anjum 2016). Hence the unique findings
of this study regarding game theory based contributions and emotional associations (shame and guilt) have additional significance.
In the previous research, generosity has been seen in relationship with trustworthiness and explored in terms of reciprocity, whereby there is the motive of
maintaining mutually beneficial relationships (Barkan et al 2015; Espı́n et al
2016; Hardin 2002). But such an exploration with conscious emotions is missing from research. For instance, previous research has indicated that there are
multifaceted possibilities of motivations for generosity (in this case being honorable through being generous). This research adds to this literature that the
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association of the possibility of felt shame may be the stronger motive behind
generosity and feeling honorable than the motive of guilt.
Although previous studies have confirmed that reciprocity is the main reason for trustworthiness (Güth et al 2000; Schotter and Sopher 2006; Bellemare
and Kröger 2007; Bornhorst et al 2010) but the impact complex emotions such
as guilt or shame have on trustworthiness has not been explored in the previous research. Generous reciprocity is seen in most games, it is even apparent in
the amount sent by the trustors and the subsequent amounts sent back by the
trustees in a given game. But the emotional significance of guilt and shame is
missing from this literature. Hence, this research bridges this gap in line with
experimental psychology and experimental economics by offering an additional
motive based on conscious emotions by suggesting that generosity is not only
related to unconditional kindness it may be related to respect related reciprocity
as well.
The findings of this research argue for the presence of a motive related to
shame, a motive that may lead to drive for active generosity in order to gain respect and hence decisions for making contributions for others’ benefit the person.
In line with psychological research on honor (Anjum 2016) this research points
to the intentionality that trustees’ trust worthy behavior. This also attempts at
answering some of the concerns raised by previous literature by showing that
there is a possibility of ruling out the prevalence of altruistic or egalitarianism
related motives (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Iranzo et al 2012).

4.1 Implications and limitations
This research has key implications for policies and advocacies for fundraising
and corporate social responsibility. Most of the western literature has set out a
negative stance on honor. This paper has conceptualized honor as an assignment
of recognition for being a member of a prestigious group. Members of honor
groups are obliged to follow their group’s honor code; not sticking to the honor
code threatens reputation and instigates condemnation. As indicated by Anjum
(2016) honor has a functional role as norms related to honor codes are recognized
and observed if someone wants to be on the pedestal of being honorable. In this
lab experiment, it is established that when someone is declared honorable, they
have a higher tendency to contribute more generously in the next rounds of the
game. These findings replicate and confirm the assumptions of honour proposed
by Anjum et al (2019).
In future research, one might consider situations with more than one honor
participant, who for example, could jointly enhance their group’s welfare as the
only contributor either based on the weakest-link technology3 or that one of
linear public goods games. Would presence of other honor participants crowd
out feeling responsible for one’s group e.g. in the sense of bystander effect due to
diffused responsibility (Darley and Latané 1968)? Would i participants respect
honor more or less when there are more honor participants, contributors to
3 The minimum of all contributions determined the level of public good from which all
group members, contributors as well as all other group participants profit equally.
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the public good based for instance on the weakest link technology (Leary and
Forsyth 1987)?
One key limitation of this study lies in the assumption that it has focused
only on the motives of honor which is more of a behavioral component and then
it is being compared with cognitive aspects such as shame and guilt. As previous
research has shown that motives are complex, especially heterogeneous motives
are more likely in trust games such as the one employed in this experiment.
Also Espı́n et al (2016) have argued that even in the two players game there is
dramatic variation in the motives and these motives are particularly social when
it comes to the trust game. This also adds heterogeneity that is non-negligible. In
this experiment the implications of these findings are further squeezed because
of two elements that we did not control for i.e. self-interest of the participants
and their drive for efficiency considerations.
Also our research does not show if participants expressed antisocial motives
such as spitefulness. Former research has shown that individuals are not solely
kind they are also capable of expressing spite in addition to selfishness and
would send zero offers to others (Brañas-Garza et al 2014). This research hence
does not capture that lack of kindness and the motives engaged on a mental or
behavioral level.

5 Conclusion
The topic explored in this paper answered two significant questions. First, does
becoming generous induce honor among other ingroup members? Second, do
people respect the generosity of others in their group and whether people respond with respect towards the generous group members? These two questions
have been heavily debated in experimental economics and business psychology
but have not been tested in cross-disciplinary experiments. Therefore, this study
provides an insight into this reoccurring conflict of speculations among social
scientists regarding why people do charity or behave generously. In fact, to become honorable and earn respect from others is the answer.
Based on an induced donation task in the lab, we elicited the most honorable
members in their respective groups of four participants. We viewed the contribution level as honor and compensations as respect of honor. We conclude that
honor participants contribute generously to increase their group’s welfare, even
at the cost of their own profit. Furthermore, honor participants seem to care
for their role and justify their entitlement to their position of becoming honorable. Other participants reward respect to honor participants by compensating
them. These findings have implications for charity, leadership, and various social
psychological aspects associated with respect and honor.
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Appendix

Fig. 2: Total profit in linear treatment
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Fig. 3: Total profit in non-linear treatment

Fig. 4: Donation size
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Fig. 5: Choices: Charity organizations

Fig. 6: Contribution of h in linear treatment
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Fig. 7: Treatment

Fig. 8: Compensation by i subjects
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Fig. 9: Treatment
Table 1: Correlation between guilt behaviour, guilt repair, shame evaluation

Guilt behavior
Guilt repair
Shame evaluation
Contribution by H in linear treatment
Contribution by H in
non-linear treatment
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Guilt behavior

Guilt repair

Shame
evaluation

1
0.22
0.54**
-0.06

0.18
0.01

0.07

0.00

-0.18

-0.08

Shame
withdrawal

-0.26
-0.33*
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